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THE TWO FACES OF FEDERALISM
ANTONIN SCALIA*

When I began to prepare some thoughts for this conference on
federalism, I got out my handy vade mecum copy of The Federalist Papers to see what they might have to say about the subject.
In reading the relevant portions, I found that they were not talking about what I expected this group to be addressing. In fact it
was quite clear that if a resurrected and updated Alexander Hamilton had been invited to this conference the subjects he would
have expected to hear addressed are quite different from - and
the tenor of his own remarks would have been quite the opposite
of - what we have heard over the past few days.
The underlying explanation for this duality of meaning in the
word "federalism" is expressed in a vaudeville routine which
many of you may know. The straight line is, "How's your wife?"
and the response, is "Compared to what?" That question, "Compared to what?", is important in all the affairs of life, not excluding federalism. In meeting to discuss federalism, we have to bear
in mind that it is a form of government midway between two extremes. At one extreme, the autonomy, the disunity, the conflict of
independent states; at the other, the uniformity, the inflexibility,
the monotony of one centralized government. Federalism is meant
to be a compromise between the two. As such, it is a stick that
can be used to beat either dog. When Alexander Hamilton exalted
its virtues, he meant it as a criticism of colonial disunity; we mean
it today -

in this group, at least -

as a criticism of central

control.
Conservatives have tended to take this non-Hamiltonian perspective for at least the past half-century, opposing the national
government's intervention and extolling the benefits of state and
local control. It is interesting to speculate why this is so. One reason, perhaps, is simply an unthinking extension of notions of natural autonomy that are quite appropriate with regard to the power
of the state over the individual into the quite different field of the
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priority of one coercive governmental unit over another. The individual possesses, as the Declaration of Independence points out, a
God-given freedom, which rightly counsels an attitude of suspicion
if not hostility towards novel impositions of governmental constraint. By contrast, no particular governmental or authoritarian
unit can claim any natural right to rule - except, perhaps, the
family, whose rights our law has generally protected through the
individuals who compose it. The decision concerning which level
of government should have the last word is, therefore, a pragmatic
one, to be determined by the practicalities of the matter. To be
sure, decision at a lower level of government tends to maximize
overall satisfaction, by permitting diversity instead of submerging
large regional majorities beneath a narrow national vote. But that
is a practical rather than a transcendental concern, to be laid beside other practical concerns such as the need for national rather
than local enforcement of certain prescriptions. It justifies a predisposition towards state and local control - but not, I think, the
degree of generalized hostility towards national law which has become a common feature of conservative thought.
A better reason for conservatives' antagonism towards federalism (in the Hamiltonian sense) is the fact that conservatives have
simply been out-gunned at the federal level for half a century.
Since the 1930's, the policies that have come from that source
have been policies that conservatives disfavor. That is surely an
understandable tactical reason for opposition to the exercise of
federal power. Unfortunately, a tactic employed for half a century
tends to develop into a philosophy. And an anti-federalist philosophy on the part of conservatives seems to me simply wrong. The
result of it is that conservatives have been fighting a two-front war
on only one front - or at least fighting it purely defensively on
one of the two fronts. When liberals are in power they do not
shrink from using the federal structure for what they consider to
be sound governmental goals. But when conservatives take charge,
the most they hope to do is to keep anything from happening. I
understand that in some of the offices of the current administration there are signs on the wall that read, "Don't just stand there;
undo something." That seems to me an inadequate approach.
Consider, for example, economic regulation - an area in which
it is clear that the Founding Fathers meant the federal government to restrain the centrifugal tendencies of the states. Conservatives believe that the free market has the ability to order things in
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the most efficient manner, and should generally be allowed to operate free of government intervention. That is a positive policy,
not the absence of one. Yet I do not know a single federal statute
that seeks to enact that policy. Numerous laws impose federal regulation to some degree and then go on to say "and the states will
not interfere," but I know of no federal statute that simply says
"the states shall not regulate." To the extent that such a policy
has been imposed, it has been by the courts through the negative
Commerce Clause. (I do not happen to think that a good idea but that is another question.) Why does it not even occur to those
who believe strongly in a policy of market freedom to have it
adopted by federal legislation in those segments of the economy
that are truly national? Let me mention a few areas where one
would at least expect this to be debated.
Anyone from a city that has recently gotten "wired" knows of
the extraordinary exactions that are imposed upon cable by municipalities. Competing applicants for the franchise are set to outbidding one another in the promise of "freebies" (although, as we
know, someone is paying for them). They offer "free" channels for
the schools, "free" channels for the city council, "free" channels
for public access, and much more. I do not think the most dyedin-the-wool anti-federalist among you would deny that the federal
government has power to establish the regulatory environment for
cable - which is, realistically, part of an interstate delivery system that brings information and entertainment from the production studios of New York and California to the individual home.
And there are, indeed, proposals that various national restrictions
be placed upon cable operations; but I am unaware of any proposed federal requirement that cable be - in one respect or another -

simply left alone.

The administration floated a proposal some time back (I do not
know what happened to it) to deny federal housing funds to cities
with rent controls. The theory was that cities should not be paid to
remedy a housing shortage that is largely of their own creation.
But if the theory is correct, and if local housing is the federal
government's proper concern, then why has no one even floated a
federal law that says, "no rent controls" period?
I could multiply the areas in which one would expect economic
conservatives to seek establishment of a federal policy excluding
state regulation: The prohibition in some building codes of construction materials that are universally recognized to be safe, and
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whose only sin is that they are not labor-intensive. State court creation of new tort theories of "enterprise liability" or of design defect which subject interstate businesses to greatly increased damages. State antitrust laws which permit treble damage actions by
indirect purchasers that the federal antitrust law has been held to
exclude. State "antiescape" laws that penalize (through the obligation to compensate workers) businesses that choose 'to close
plants and move to another state.
I am not suggesting that federal action barring state regulation
would be a good thing in all of these fields. In some, it seems to
me, the national power exists, but the national interest is not sufficient to justify intervention. The point I wish to make, however, is
that with all these targets out there - and with what has generally been regarded as a conservative economic mood in Washington - one would have expected at least a few targets to be shot
at. The inaction has less to do with the merits than with the unfortunate tendency of conservatives to regard the federal government, at least in its purely domestic activities, as something to be
resisted, or better yet (when conservatives are in power) undone,
rather than as a legitimate and useful instrument of policy. Such
an attitude is ultimately self-defeating, since it converts the instrument into a tool that cuts only one way.
I urge you, then - as Hamilton would have urged you - to
keep in mind that the federal government is not bad but good.
The trick is to use it wisely.
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